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NOTE
No Holds Barred: The Use of Restrictive
Behavioral Intervention in Missouri Public
Schools
State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
Claire Hawley*

I. INTRODUCTION
While students in public school still retain certain constitutional rights,
these rights are not coextensive to those of adults in other settings.1 This is
largely due to the traditional deference in American jurisprudence to school
officials on decisions of student discipline.2 This deference is generally
*
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Professor Alexander for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of
this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
I am also especially thankful to my parents, Doug and Kim Hawley, and Dr. Jacob
Young for their extensive and unwavering support.
1. See infra note 44; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 273 (1988) (holding that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns).
2. The common law view of the legal status of students is embodied by the
doctrine of in loco parentis. In 1769, Sir William Blackstone articulated the
doctrine as follows: “[A] parent may . . . delegate part of his [or her] parental
authority . . . to the tutor or schoolmaster of his [or her] child; who is then in loco
parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his
charge, . . . that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
purposes for which he is employed.” Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect:
Blackstone’s Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse
of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 17, 18–19 (2002). Effectively, “[s]chools
assume custody of students while they are deprived of the protection of their
parents while attending school.” Id. at 19; see also Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to
Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 452 (2001)
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understood to reflect the uniquely difficult nature of student discipline, which
involves the delicate balancing of students’ constitutional right to a public
education with their right to a safe learning environment.3
One area in which school officials are afforded discretion is in the
physical restraint of students.4 For the purposes of this Note, physical restraint
is defined as “the use of person-to-person physical contact to restrict the free
movement of all or a portion of a student’s body.”5 While physical restraint
is conceptually similar to seclusion and corporal punishment, there are critical
distinctions.6 When a school official physically restrains a student, s/he is
using force for the purposes of controlling a disruptive student who poses an
imminent threat to his or her own safety or the safety of others.7 In doing so,
(“When children enter the public schools, they leave their parents behind and
experience a unique context, one controlled by state officials. At school, these
officials have temporary custody of students to further their primary goal—
education.”).
3. See generally Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional
Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 59–60
(1996).
4. Id. at 63.
5. This is the definition used by the Missouri Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education’s “Model Policy.” MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY &
SECONDARY EDUC., EDUCATION MODEL POLICY ON SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT
(2020),
https://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/se_compliance_model_policy_seclusion_a
nd_restraint_july_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RL3-GETX]. “It does not include
briefly holding a student without undo force for instructional or other purposes,
briefly holding a student to calm them, taking a student’s hand to transport them
for safety purposes, physical escort or intervening in a fight.” Id.
6. Restraint is generally defined as “the use of physical force, with or
without the use of any physical device or material, to restrict the free movement
of all or a portion of a student’s body.” H.B. 1568(1), 100th Gen. Assemb. Reg.
Sess.
2
(Mo.
2020)
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills201/hlrbillspdf/4155H.01I.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RKY9-KULQ]. Seclusion, on the other hand, involves placing
a student under involuntary, solitary confinement in a physical area in which the
student is physically prevented from leaving. H.B. 1568(2), 100th Gen. Assemb.
Reg. Sess. 2 (Mo. 2020). Corporal punishment is similar to physical restraint
insofar as school officials use force against students; however, corporal
punishment involves the use of force to discipline while restraint generally
involves the use of force to control a disruptive student who poses an imminent
threat to their safety or the safety of others. American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry, Corporal Punishment in Schools, (September 2014),
https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/1988/corporal_punishment_in_s
chools.aspx.
7. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: RESOURCE
DOCUMENT 2 (2012), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/restraints-andseclusion-resources.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6ND-MECY].
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school officials are required to balance the student’s right to education and
due process with the safety of others.8 Missouri school officials are left with
little guidance from the federal and state governments when making these
complex, and often split-second, decisions.9 The Missouri Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education (“MODESE”) provides a Model Policy,
but it is non-binding upon local school boards.10 Local school boards have
the authority to create their own policy for the use of physical restraints.11 The
lack of reporting requirements limits the collection of data on the use of
physical restraint in Missouri public schools, but the most recent federal data
from the 2015-16 school year show that 59,217 students were restrained
nationwide and at least 1990 in Missouri.12 The data also demonstrate that
8. See id.
9. Jessica Butler, How Safe is the Schoolhouse? An Analysis of State
Seclusion and Restraint Laws and Policies, at 14, 131 (2019),
https://www.aapd.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/seclusion-and-restraints.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G66Y-J9LM ].
10. Id.
11. While the vast majority of Missouri’s local school boards have adopted
policies that allow for a broader employment of physical restraint, local school
boards could theoretically prohibit physical restraint except in the most extreme
circumstances. See MO. REV. STAT. § 160.263(2) (2018). The wisdom of such
policies have been called into question by many leading education policy experts,
who argue that physical restraint often escalates defiant or dangerous behavior,
rather than reduce it. See, e.g., Classrooms in Crisis: Examining the
Inappropriate Use of Seclusion and Restraint Practices: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education of the H.
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 116th Cong. 3 (2019)
https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/SugaiTestimony022719.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A44N-JQBG] (statement of George Sugai, Ph.D., Neag School
of Education, University of Connecticut); Beyond Seclusion and Restraint:
Creating Positive Learning Environments for All Students: Hearing Before the
Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 2 (2012)
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Crimmins.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HNS4-DDTP] (statement of Daniel Crimmins, Ph.D., Director,
Center for Leadership in Disability).
12. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015-16 STATE AND NATIONAL ESTIMATIONS,
https://ocrdata.ed.gov/StateNationalEstimations/Estimations_2015_16
[https://perma.cc/R88V-6ZCG]. The use of physical restraint in Missouri public
schools increased only slightly from the 2013-14 school year, in which 1,932
students were restrainted. .S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION,
2013-2014, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/civil-rights-data-collection-2013-14
[https://perma.cc/37YE-SUKY]. There are ongoing concerns that the use of
physical restraints are underreported, especially in large school districts. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-551R, K-12 EDUCATION: EDUCATION
SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ADDRESS INACCURACIES IN FEDERAL
RESTRAINT AND INCLUSION DATA (2019); Joseph Shapiro, National Data
Confirm Cases of Restraint and Seclusion in Public Schools, NPR (June 18,
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physical restraint is employed inequitably and has a disparate impact on
students with disabilities and students of color.13
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and holding of State ex rel. Alsup
v. Kanatzar, which upheld official immunity for a school official who broke
a student’s arm while attempting to physically restrain the student.14 Part III
provides legal context for the Kanatzar decision, including the federal
government’s limited but significant role in school discipline and Missouri’s
localized and deferential approach to disciplinary issues. Part IV offers an indepth discussion of the arguments advanced in State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar,
the court’s reasoning, and its ultimate conclusion that the school official was
entitled to official immunity. Finally, Part V addresses the response to
Kanatzar, highlighting recent legislative proposals to change legal framework
for school discipline in Missouri.
Part V concludes with policy
recommendations aimed at strengthening protections for Missouri students
and limiting the use of physical restraints in public schools.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The most recent Supreme Court of Missouri case involving the physical
restraint of a student, State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, expanded the official
immunity of public school employees for negligence in the employment of
physical restraints.15 This case arose after Israel Mariano, a student at
Independence Academy, an alternative school in the Independence School
District, brought a negligence action against Carlos Alsup, an in-school
suspension teacher, in the teacher’s individual capacity.16 Mariano alleged he
sustained a broken arm after Alsup attempted to place him in a physical
restraint.17
On the morning of April 28, 2016, Mariano refused to go to school and
failed to get on his school bus.18 Mariano’s mother drove him to school
2014),
https://www.npr.org/2014/06/19/322915388/national-data-confirmscases-of-restraint-and-seclusion-in-public-schools
[https://perma.cc/98MNVL36].
13. Data from the 2015-16 school year shows that students of color and
students with disabilities are disproportionately subjected to physical restraints.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015-16 STATE AND NATIONAL ESTIMATIONS,
https://ocrdata.ed.gov/StateNationalEstimations/Estimations_2015_16
[https://perma.cc/R88V-6ZCG]. Nationally, students who identified as Black or
African American made up 15.4% of all students enrolled in public schools and
27.4% of students who were restrained. Id. In the same school year, students
with disabilities comprised only 12.6% of the nationwide school enrollment but
accounted for 75.9% of students who were restrained. Id.
14. 588 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 189.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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herself, calling ahead to Independence Academy to inform them of the
situation.19 When they arrived at Independence Academy, a physical struggle
ensued between Mariano and his mother.20 After Mariano’s mother brought
him inside the school, Alsup and another staff member “took hold of him.”21
In the course of physically restraining him, Alsup broke Mariano’s arm.22
In compliance with state law requiring all local school boards to adopt a
written policy for restrictive behavioral interventions,23 the Independence
School District had an established disciplinary policy known as District Board
Policy 2770 (“Policy 2770”).24 Both parties agreed that Policy 2770 fulfills
the statutory requirements of Missouri Revised Statute Section 160.263.25
Under Policy 2770, the Independence School District requires its employees
to undergo training from the Crisis Prevention Institute (“CPI”), which
“provides training for multiple methods of physically restraining a student.”26
Alsup attended the CPI training program.27
Mariano sued Alsup in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,28 alleging
Alsup was negligent in physically restraining Mariano and therefore liable for
his injuries.29 Alsup filed two motions to dismiss, both of which were
overruled.30 Alsup later filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing he was
entitled to official immunity.31 On August 30, 2018, Judge James F. Kanatzar
denied Alsup’s motion for summary judgment because Alsup failed to

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (“Pursuant to Policy 2770, an in-school suspension teacher is
permitted to physically restrain students in three situations: (1) ‘[i]n an emergency
situation;’ (2) ‘[w]hen less restrictive measures [have] not effectively deescalated
the situation;’ and (3) when otherwise specified by various types of plans. Policy
2770 also provides physical restraint shall ‘[o]nly be used for as long as necessary
to resolve the actual risk of danger or harm that warranted the physical restraint.’
And the school personnel using physical restraint shall ‘[u]se no more than the
degree of force necessary to protect the student or other persons from imminent
physical harm.’ Further, Policy 2770 permits the school personnel using physical
restraint to only ‘[u]se methods of restraint in which the personnel has received
district approved training.’”).
23. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.263 (2018).
24. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d at 189.
25. Id. at 189 n.4.
26. Id. at 189–90.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Brief for the Respondent, State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187
(Mo. 2019) (en banc) (No. SC97427) at 1, 6..
29. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d at 190.
30. Id.
31. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11

1176

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

demonstrate there were no genuine issues of material fact.32 Alsup then
sought a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western
District, which was denied.33 On September 24, 2018, Alsup filed a writ of
prohibition with the Supreme Court of Missouri, which was preliminarily
issued on October 2, 2018.34 The Supreme Court of Missouri then proceeded
to hear arguments on the original remedial writ, with jurisdiction pursuant to
Article V, Section 4.1 of the Missouri Constitution.35
The issue presented was “whether the physical restraint technique used
by [Alsup] was a discretionary or ministerial act.”36 Mariano argued that
Alsup was not entitled to official immunity because of evidence proffered by
Mariano’s expert witnesses that Alsup performed the restraint techniques
improperly.37 Mariano further argued that the manner in which restraint
techniques are performed by school officials is not a discretionary act, but
rather “a ministerial act which must be performed in a certain way, once the
decision is made to physically restrain the student.”38 Judge Paul C. Wilson,
writing for a unanimous majority, held that Alsup was entitled to official
immunity because a teacher’s duty to physically restrain a student in
compliance with the school district’s written policy was not a ministerial
duty.39

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution is silent as to the federal government’s
duty to educate its citizens, thus public education in the United States has
traditionally been left to the state and local governments.40 However, the
federal government does play a limited role in education policy through the
United States Department of Education (“DoEd”), Congress, and the federal
judiciary.41 Subpart A provides an overview of federal law as well as actions
taken by the federal government regarding student discipline, with a specific
focus on the use of physical restraints in public schools. Subpart B
32. Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 5; see also Respondent’s Order,
A001-002, as cited in Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Prohibition.
33. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 5; see also Order from Western
District Court of Appeals, A003-004.
34. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6.
37. See Plaintiff’s Suggestions in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, A012-015 [https://perma.cc/W7TV-J5DL].
38. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 6.
39. State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc).
40. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION (2017),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html
[https://perma.cc/DW7X9YQD].
41. Id.
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encapsulates the relevant actions taken by the Missouri legislature and state
educational agency leading up to State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar.

A. The Federal Government’s Role in Education
During the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a number of
seminal cases on school discipline and due process.42 Taken together, these
cases stand for the principle that the constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings, and the rights of students must be applied in light of the special
characteristics of a school environment.43 These cases and their underlying
legal principles are necessary to understand the current state of the law
regarding the use of physical force against students in public schools.
First, in Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that students facing
temporary suspension are afforded sufficient due process if they are provided
with an opportunity to have an informal hearing with school administrators
before such suspensions.44 Then, in Horowitz v. Board of Curators,
University of Missouri, the Supreme Court considered whether a public
university student is constitutionally entitled to a hearing prior to dismissal
from school for academic reasons.45 Ruling against a former medical student,
the Court concluded that “the determination whether to dismiss a student for
academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and
is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative
decisionmaking.”46
While these cases show that the constitutional rights of public school
students differ significantly from that of adults in non-educational settings,
only one directly addressed the use of physical restraint against students: In

42. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Bd. of Curators of Univ.
of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977).
43. According to the majority in Goss, “[Y]oung people do not ‘shed their
constitutional rights’ at the schoolhouse door.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (1975)
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)). While this is certainly true, Justice Powell’s dissent reveals the
underlying nuances. First, Justice Powell points out “the unique nature of public
education and the correspondingly limited role of the judiciary in its supervision,”
which was recognized by the Tinker Court: “Until today, and except in the special
context of the First Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of children
and teenagers in the elementary and secondary schools have not been analogized
to the rights of adults or to those accorded college students. Even with respect to
the First Amendment, the rights of children have not been regarded as ‘coextensive with those of adults.’” Goss, 419 U.S. at 591 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
44. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
45. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 80 (1978).
46. Id. at 78.
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Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court considered whether a hearing is
required before a student can be subjected to corporal punishment by school
officials.47 The fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Leo Ingraham, was forcibly
restrained and paddled by a school administrator for allegedly failing to leave
the stage of the school auditorium when asked.48 Ingraham sought medical
treatment for a hematoma caused by the paddling.49 By and through his
parents, Ingraham sued, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights
to be free from “cruel and unusual punishment.”50 The Supreme Court
disagreed, ruling that the corporal punishment of students could not be
considered cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.51 Moreover,
corporal punishment is lawful regardless of whether the student is provided
notice or the opportunity for a prior hearing.52
Aside from the judiciary, the federal executive and legislature also play
a limited role in education law. Since it became an official cabinet-level
agency in 1979,53 the DoEd traditionally served as a support mechanism for
public schools in a data-gathering and information-dissemination capacity.54
However, funding from DoEd comprises only about eight percent of the
overall funding received by public elementary and secondary schools.55
Nevertheless, the DoEd continues to “play a leadership role in the ongoing
national dialogue over how to improve the results of our education system for
all students.”56 To that end, the DoEd has actively cultivated a discussion
about school discipline.57
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977).
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 653 n.1.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 682.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION
(2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what.html
[https://perma.cc/T97H-M3ZM].
54. Christie B. Carrino, Gatekeepers to Success: Missouri’s Exclusionary
Approach to School Discipline, 52 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 171, 174 (2016).
55. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION (2017),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (“[T]he Federal contribution to
elementary and secondary education is about 8 percent, which includes funds not
only from the Department of Education (ED) but also from other Federal agencies,
such as the department of Health and Human Services’ Head Start program and
the Department of Agriculture’s School Lunch program.”).
56. Id.
57. “Restraint or seclusion should not be used as routine school safety
measures; that is, they should not be implemented except in situations where a
child’s behavior poses imminent danger of serious physical harm to self or others
and not as a routine strategy implemented to address instructional problems or
inappropriate behavior (e.g., disrespect, noncompliance, insubordination, out of
seat), as a means of coercion or retaliation, or as a convenience.” U.S. DEP’T OF
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Although the DoEd has a limited role in education compared to states
and municipalities, Congress can enact federal education legislation pursuant
to the Spending Clause of the Constitution.58 Congress’s spending power
includes the ability to “attach conditions on the [states’] receipt of federal
funds. . . ‘to further broad policy objectives . . . .’”59 Notable examples of
such legislation include the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”),60
the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (“NDEA”),61 and the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (“IDEA”).62 Federal
law currently protects children from restraint and seclusion in hospitals and
other inpatient institutions.63
EDUC., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: RESOURCE DOCUMENT 3 (2012),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/restraints-and-seclusion-resources.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73KD-4FCV].
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”).
59. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). Most federal education legislation currently
in effect was passed pursuant to the Dole framework, which provides the
circumstances under which Congress may use its spending power: (1) it must be
used in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) the condition must be unambiguous; (3)
the condition should be related to federal interest in particular programs; and (4)
there cannot be an independent constitutional bar to the conditioned grant. Id. at
207–08.
60. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
61. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat.
1580 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
62. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub.
L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). In addition to these statutes, Race to the Top, the Obama
Administration’s education reform program, is also influential. Race to the Top
works alongside No Child Left Behind to offer competitive grants to states who
are “leading the way with ambitious yet achievable plans for implementing
coherent, compelling, and comprehensive education reform.” U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC.,
RACE
TO
THE
TOP
(2016),
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html [https://perma.cc/ADN934CK]. While the success of the program is controversial, evaluating the merits
of the program is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch, Obama’s
Race to the Top Will Not Improve Education, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2010,
1:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-ravitch/obamas-race-tothe-topwi_b_666598.html [https://perma.cc/MZ56-UBSY].
63. 42 U.S.C. § 290jj (2006).
This law, known as the Children’s Health Act of 2000, was passed in response to
studies that indicated a staggering number of deaths caused by restraint in
psychiatric and mental health facilities. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF.,
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Congress’s role in school discipline policy extends beyond legislation.
In 2009, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and Labor
requested the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) review the
available evidence on the use of restraint and seclusion that resulted in death
and abuse at public and private schools and treatment centers.64 The GAO
reviewed applicable federal and state law, interviewed experts and
government officials, and investigated abuse allegations made by students
between 1990 and 2009.65 On May 19, 2009, the GAO published Seclusions
and Restraints: Selected Cases of Death and Abuse at Public and Private
Schools and Treatment Centers (the “GAO Report”).66
The GAO Report presented three key findings.67 First, in the absence of
any federal regulation of the use of physical restraint and seclusion, states had
enacted a wide variety of divergent regulations.68 Second, there were no
reliable national data on the use of physical restraint and seclusion in
schools.69 However, the GAO identified several hundred cases of alleged
abuse, including some that resulted in death, related to physical restraint or
seclusion of students in public and private schools.70 Finally, the GAO Report
provided case studies where the abuse of students by physical restraint or
seclusion resulted in criminal conviction, civil liability, or massive settlement
payouts.71 The GAO further observed that many of the instances of alleged
abuse were associated with untrained or poorly trained staff.72
The GAO report had a significant – albeit temporary – impact on federal
legislators. Following a May 19, 2009 hearing on the GAO Report before the
House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and Labor, members of
Congress began drafting federal legislation to address the use of physical
restraint and seclusion in public schools.73 The 111th Congress introduced

MENTAL HEALTH: IMPROPER RESTRAINT OR SECLUSION USE PLACES PEOPLE AT
RISK
6–7
(1999),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99176.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6N8-PFFV] (describing the dangerous use and effects of
restraint and seclusion in mental health facilities and hospitals and showing that
children are disproportionately affected).
64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND
RESTRAINTS: SELECTED CASES OF DEATH AND ABUSE AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS
AND
TREATMENT
CENTERS
(2009),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09719t.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM7C-Q96J].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Examining the Abusive and Deadly Use of Seclusion and Restraint in
Schools: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. (2009),
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one House bill and two Senate bills.74 All of the bills were debated by their
respective chambers, but none of them ever became law.75
The 112th Congress reintroduced the House bill (H.R. 1381) and one of
the Senate bills (S. 2020).76 The shared purposes of the bills were to: (1)
prevent and reduce the use of physical restraint and seclusion in schools;77 (2)
protect students from “physical or mental abuse”;78 and (3) assist states and
local school boards in “establishing policies and procedures”79 and “the
development of effective intervention and prevention practices that do not use
restraints and seclusion.”80 The proposed bills would have authorized support
to states and municipalities in adopting more stringent oversight of the use of
restraint and seclusion in schools and would have established requirements
for collecting data on the use of these practices in schools.81 However, no
further actions were taken on S. 2020 after its introduction82 and H.R. 1381
was referred to various subcommittees but never voted on.83 Thus, the
momentum generated by the GAO Report in 2009 dissipated by 2012, leaving
no legislative impact.

B. Missouri’s Role in Education
In the United States, education is mainly a concern of state and local
government.84 While the federal Constitution makes no mention of education,
an entire Article of the Missouri Constitution is dedicated to the topic.85
However, the Missouri Constitution is silent on student discipline and the
Missouri legislature has done very little to fill in the gaps.86 The 2009 GAO
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg49597/pdf/CHRG111hhrg49597.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB68-RAEH].
74. See Keeping All Students Safe Act, H.R. 4247, 111th Cong. (2009);
Preventing Harmful Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act, S. 2860, 111th Cong.
(2009); Keeping All Students Safe Act, S. 3895, 111th Cong. (2010).
75. H.R. 4247; S. 2860; S. 3895.
76. H.R. 4247 and S. 3895 were reintroduced as H.R. 1381 and S. 2020,
respectively. See Keeping All Students Safe Act, H.R. 1381, 112th Cong. (2011);
Keeping All Students Safe Act, S. 2020, 112th Cong. (2011).
77. H.R. 1381 § (3)(1).
78. H.R. 1381 § 3(3)(A); S. 2020 § 3(2).
79. H.R. 1381 § 3(5)(A).
80. S. 2020 § 3(1).
81. Compare S. 2020 § 6 (requiring state educational agencies to submit a
report to the U.S. Secretary of Education on the use of physical restraints), with
H.R. 1381 §6(b) (requiring the same reports).
82. S. 2020..
83. H.R. 1381.
84. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION (2012),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html.
85. MO. CONST. art. IX.
86. See MO. CONST. (providing no guindance on student discipline).
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Report referenced Missouri as one of nineteen states with no laws or
regulations governing the use of physical restraint.87 Not only does Missouri
have far fewer rules than other states concerning the use of physical restraints
in public schools, it currently confers upon local school boards near-absolute
authority to establish their own disciplinary policies and largely govern
themselves.88 According to a 2010 DoEd survey of state laws on seclusion
and restraint, “Missouri has adopted a widely known and well-established
philosophy and tradition of local control in education. Schools, districts[,]
and communities take pride in their ability to develop and implement local
policies.”89
In July 2010, following the federal push for enhanced state laws and
regulations, Missouri enacted new legislation pertaining to physical
restraint.90 This new law added three additional requirements.91 First, all
school discipline policies were required to prohibit the confinement of a
student in an unattended, locked space, except for in an emergency situation
while awaiting law enforcement.92 Next, in addition to its existing discipline
policies under Section 160.261, each local school board was required to
formulate “a written policy that comprehensively addresses the use of
restrictive behavioral interventions as a form of discipline or behavior
management technique.”93
This policy must be consistent with
“professionally accepted practices and standards of student discipline,
behavior management, health[,] and safety, including the safe schools act.”94
Under this law, school boards were required to (1) define restraint and
seclusion; (2) describe the “circumstances under which restrictive behavioral
intervention is allowed and prohibited”; (3) outline specific implementation
requirements for restrictive behavioral intervention; and (4) specify the
documentation, notice, and permission requirements when restrictive

87. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND
RESTRAINTS: SELECTED CASES OF DEATH AND ABUSE AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS
AND
TREATMENT
CENTERS
(2009),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09719t.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFF4-U5PS].
88. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261 (2018). Among the decisions delegated to
local school boards were (1) the use of corporal punishment, (2) the school board’s
reporting requirements for acts of violence, and (3) the definition of violence. Id.
at § 160.261(9)–(10).
89. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT
STATUTES, REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND GUIDANCE, BY STATE AND TERRITORY:
INFORMATION AS REPORTED TO THE REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE CENTERS AND
GATHERED
FROM
OTHER
SOURCES,
120
(2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/summary-by-state.pdf [].
90. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.263.
91. See id.
92. Id. at § 160.263(1).
93. Id. at § 160.263(2).
94. Id.
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behavioral intervention is used.95 Finally, the new law required MODESE to
disseminate to local school boards a model policy which complied with the
new law.96
As required, MODESE released its “Model Policy on Seclusion and
Restraint” (“Model Policy”) on July 1, 2010.97 The Model Policy clarified
some of the statutory ambiguities, including the provision of a definition for
“physical restraint.”98 First, it limits the use of physical restraint to (1)
emergencies; (2) when less restrictive measures fail to de-escalate; or (3)
when physical restraint is specifically authorized by the student’s
individualized education plan (“IEP”), Section 504 Plan, or other parentally
agreed-upon behavioral plan.99 The Model Policy also lists four requirements
for the use of physical restraint. Physical restraint “shall only be used for as
long as necessary to resolve the actual risk of danger or harm” and shall “use
no more than the degree of force necessary to protect the student or other
persons from imminent bodily injury.”100 Further, physical restraints can
“[o]nly be done by school personnel trained in the proper use of restraint.”101
Finally, the Model Policy instructs against the “place[ment of] pressure or
weight on the chest, lungs, sternum, diaphragm, back, neck or throat of the
student which restricts breathing.”102
The Model Policy also provides that school personnel may only use
methods of restraint “in which the person has received district approved
training” and must “[c]onduct [the] restraint with at least one additional adult

95. Id.
96. Id. at § 160.263(3).
97. MISSOURI DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., MODEL
POLICY ON SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT (2010).
98. The Model Policy defines “physical restraint” as “a personal restriction
that immobilizes or reduces the ability of a student to move his torso, arms, legs,
or head freely. It does not include briefly holding a student without undo force
for instructional purposes, briefly holding a student to calm them, taking a
student’s hand to transport them for safety purposes, physical escort or
intervening in a fight.” Id. Many school boards, including the St. Louis School
District, have adopted this definition in its entirety. See, e.g., SPECIAL ADMIN.
BD. OF THE TRANSITIONAL SCH. DIST. OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, SCHOOL
VIOLENCE AND RESTRICTIVE BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION POLICY (2012),
http://sab.slps.org/Board_Education/policies/5144.1.htm
[https://perma.cc/5W5W-NRFC] (Defining “Physical Restraint” as “The use of
person to person physical contact to restrict the free movement of all or a portion
of a student’s body. It does not include briefly holding a student without undue
force for instructional or other purposes, briefly holding a student to calm the
student, taking a student’s hand to transport him or her for safety purposes,
physical escort, or intervening in a fight.”).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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present and in line of sight unless other school personnel are not immediately
available due to the unforeseeable nature of the emergency situation.”103
Finally, as the Model Policy notes, “Physical restraints should never be used
as a form of punishment or for the convenience of school personnel.”104 Any
and all guidance issued by MODESE is non-binding upon local school
boards.105 Schools may institute their own language as long as it complies
with the statutory requirements.106

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri began its analysis
with a discussion of the circumstances under which a public official is immune
from suit. “‘Immunity’ connotes not only immunity from judgment but also
immunity from suit.”107 While generally considered an extraordinary remedy,
a writ of prohibition is proper when a defendant is legally entitled to
immunity.108 The court carefully differentiated between sovereign immunity,
which was not at issue in this case, and official immunity.109
Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects a public official from
liability for negligence that is “strictly related to the performance of
discretionary duties”110 and “without malice.”111 Unlike sovereign immunity,
which has a statutory basis,112 “[o]fficial immunity remains a matter of
common law alone.”113 The party asserting the affirmative defense
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Butler, supra note 10, at 14.
106. Id.
107. State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc) (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Dep’t of Agric. v. McHenry, 687 S.W.2d 178,
181 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
108. Id. (citing State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Mo.
1986) (en banc)).
109. “Broadly speaking, sovereign immunity protects governmental entities
from tort liability and can be invoked when a governmental official is sued only
in his or her official capacity. Official immunity, on the other hand, protects public
officials sued in their individual capacities ‘from liability for alleged acts of
negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the
performance of discretionary acts.’” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Twiehaus, 706
S.W.2d at 444.).
110. Id. at 191 (quoting Green v. Lebanon R-III Sch. Dist., 13 S.W.23 278,
284 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)).
111. Id.
112. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 537.600–537.650 (2016).
113. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d at190 n.6 (citing Southers v. City of Farmington,
263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)). (“Two types of immunity often are
confused when suit is brought against a governmental official. Broadly speaking,
sovereign immunity protects governmental entities from tort liability and can be
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of official immunity bears the burden of pleading and proving that s/he is
entitled to that defense.114 As the court pointed out, the underlying policy of
the official immunity doctrine is “to allow public officials to ‘make judgments
affecting the public safety and welfare’ without ‘[t]he fear of personal
liability.’”115 In establishing that Alsup was a public official, the court pointed
out that “Alsup is an employee of the school district, a governmental entity”116
and “Mariano does not dispute that Alsup is a public official.”117
The court then outlined the “narrow exception” to official immunity:
“[W]hen a public officer fails to perform a ministerial duty required of him
by law, he may be personally liable for the damages caused.”118 The court
provided a detailed discussion of the differences between ministerial and
discretionary acts.119 Notably, a ministerial act is one that is “merely
‘clerical’”120 and “of such a routine and mundane nature that it is likely to be
delegated to subordinate officials.”121 To clarify the distinction further, the
court then analogized ministerial acts falling outside of the protection of
official immunity to ministerial acts that an official can be compelled to
perform by writ of mandamus.122 The proper test, which is the same under
both inquiries, is whether the duty is “of a clerical nature which a public
officer is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his
own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be
performed.”123 If the answer is yes, the duty is ministerial.124 Thus, in the

invoked when a governmental official is sued only in his or her official
capacity. Official immunity, on the other hand, protects public officials sued in
their individual capacities “from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed
during the course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary
acts.”).
114. Id. at 193 (citing Warren v. Paragon Techs. Grp., Inc., 950 S.W.2d 844,
846 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)).
115. Id. at 190 (quoting Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. 1987)
(en banc), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int’l Airport,
193 S.W.3d 760, 765 n.8 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)).
116. Id. at 193 (citing Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, 292 (1877)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 191 (citing Knox County. v. Hunolt, 19 S.W. 628, 630 (Mo. 1892)).
119. Id. at 191–92.
120. Id. at 191 (citing McFaul v. Haley, 166 Mo. 56, 65 S.W. 995, 998 (Mo.
1901)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 191–92.
123. Id. at 192 (quoting Curtis v. Mo. Democratic Party, 548 S.W.3d 909, 915
(Mo. 2018) (en banc)).
124. Id. at 191–92.
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eyes of the court, “the central question is whether there is any room
whatsoever for variation in when and how a particular task can be done.”125
Mariano advanced a nuanced argument: Although he conceded that the
decision to use a physical restraint was discretionary, he maintained that the
manner in which a physical restraint was used is ministerial.126 In the court’s
view, Mariano “focuse[d] almost exclusively on the portion of the test for
clerical or ministerial duties that refers to ‘obedience to the mandate of legal
authority.’”127 The court expressly stated that it is irrelevant, in determining
whether a public official’s duty is ministerial, that a “statute or regulation may
confer authority – or even a duty – to act.”128 Thus, even when a public is
statutorily required to act in a certain way in a certain situation – whether it
be “‘fairly,’ ‘competently,’ ‘safely,’ or ‘reasonably’” – the action itself still
falls within official immunity because “what constitutes fair, competent, safe,
or reasonable may differ from time to time, place to place, and official to
official.”129 The court thus concluded that the decision to physically restrain
a student is a discretionary duty and, because Alsup had neither a “clear and
unequivocal duty to restrain Mariano” nor “to use a particular restraint in a
particular way,” he was officially immune from suit.130
The Court also rejected Mariano’s argument that the task of student
restraint was ministerial because Policy 2770 expressly limited Alsup’s use of
physical restraints to “those methods of restraint in which the personnel has
received district approved training.”131 Because the CPI training included
multiple physical restraint techniques, the court reasoned that Alsup was
“authorized to select the [technique] he deemed appropriate, employ it with
the amount of force he deemed necessary, and continue it for as long as he
deemed proper.”132 The court briefly addressed the testimony of Mariano’s
expert witness, Dr. James Monk, who asserted that Alsup had applied the
125. Id. at 191; see also State ex rel. Clarke v. West, 198 S.W. 1111, 1113
(Mo. 1917) (en banc) (holding mandamus will not lie to direct “the particular
action he will take in the matter” when law authorizes the officer to choose
between alternatives).
126. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d at 193. “If the restraint had been properly
executed, pursuant to the District’s policy and training, the Plaintiff’s arm would
not have been broken.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 12.
127. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d at 192–93.
128. Id. at 192. “[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the law authorizes,
regulates, or requires an action. Instead, it is whether the action itself is ministerial
or clerical.” Id.
129. Id. at 193.
130. Id. at 193–94.
131. Id. at 194. “Nothing in Policy 2770 imposed a clerical or ministerial duty
on Alsup under these circumstances. Cf. Clarke, 198 S.W. at 1113 (holding
“where an officer . . . has considered and determined what his course of action is
to be . . . his action is not subject to review or control by mandamus”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).” Id.
132. Id. at 194.
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physical restraint technique incorrectly.133 Dr. Monk further testified that
Mariano’s arm would not have been broken if Alsup had properly restrained
him.134 In the court’s view, Dr. Monk’s testimony “undercut Mariano’s
argument that Alsup was engaged in a ministerial task” because it
demonstrated that the use of physical restraint involves discretionary
judgment.135
In closing, the court compared Alsup’s duty in this case to the “similar,
though plainly not identical, situation in which police officers were confronted
with an armed individual.”136 Official immunity is intended to shield public
officials from liability in situations like these, which are “teeming with the
necessity for quick judgment calls.”137 This is true even when “hindsight may
demonstrate errors in judgment which might be branded as negligent by
qualified evaluators.”138 Finally, the court concluded with a decisive
affirmation of Alsup’s immunity: “If five in-school suspension teachers had
been confronted with a child acting the way Mariano was acting, all five could
have acted differently and yet each could have remained in compliance with
Policy 2770. This is the very antithesis of a clerical or ministerial duty.”139
The court thus granted Alsup’s motion for summary judgment and reversed
the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals.140

V. COMMENT
Despite the 2010 attempt at clarification, Missouri law remains vague
with regard to the use of physical restraint against public school students.
There is no statutory definition of “physical restraint.”141 As a result, local
school boards retain very broad discretion to define and draft their own
discipline policies as well as the authority to self-regulate their compliance.142
133. Id. at 193.
134. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 9.
135. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d at 193 n.10.
136. Id. at 194 (citing Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int’l, 193
S.W.3d 760, 765 n.8 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)). “In holding the officers were entitled
to official immunity, this Court explained: ‘It is hard to imagine a setting more
demanding of judgment than one in which line officers . . . confront a person who
has recently flourished a gun.’” Id. (quoting Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865).
137. Id. at 194 (quoting Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865).
138. Id. (quoting Green, 738 S.W.2d at 866).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 193 (citing ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply
Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
141. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 160.261, 160.263 (2016).
142. See, e.g., SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND RESTRICTIVE BEHAVIORAL
INTERVENTION POLICY, supra note 98 (Defining “Physical Restraint” as “The use
of person to person physical contact to restrict the free movement of all or a
portion of a student’s body. It does not include briefly holding a student without

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11

1188

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

Missouri law prohibits only locked seclusion, except when awaiting law
enforcement.143
Missouri does not currently impose any reporting
requirements on local school boards, except where a student was locked (not
merely placed) in a seclusion room.144 This is the extent of the legal
obligations placed upon Missouri school districts regarding the physical
restraint of students. Subpart A discusses the various bills proposed and
considered by the Missouri legislature to reform the state’s approach to
physical restraint.
The current state of Missouri law becomes more troubling when
compared to other states. Missouri is among four jurisdictions – South
Dakota, Nebraska, and Washington, D.C. – with the least protection for
students subjected to physical discipline.145 As of July 2019, twenty-nine
states have laws that provide meaningful protection from physical restraint.146
Twenty-three states have statutes protecting children from the use of physical
restraint except for when the student is an immediate threat of danger to
themselves or others.147 Missouri has no such statute.148 Current Missouri
law does not provide sufficient safeguards for students’ constitutional rights
or physical safety and thus must be changed. Subpart B outlines numerous
policy recommendations to ameliorate the lack of guidance for school
officials and lack of protection for students in Missouri, based in part on
reforms already enacted in a majority of other states.

undue force for instructional or other purposes, briefly holding a student to calm
the student, taking a student’s hand to transport him or her for safety purposes,
physical escort, or intervening in a fight.”).
143. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.263(1) (2017).
144. See § 160.263.
145. Butler, supra note 10, at 14 (reporting that, as of July 2019, the states with
the “weakest protection for students” were Missouri, which bans only solitary
locked seclusion unless awaiting law enforcement; Nebraska, which requires local
education agencies to adopt restraint and seclusion policies, without imposing any
requirements whatsoever; Washington, D.C., which prohibits only
“unreasonable” restraint; and South Dakota, which requires school district
policies, but little else).
146. See id. at 11. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. “To provide meaningful
protection, a state must fall into one of two categories. One, it provides multiple
protections against restraint and seclusion for students. Two, it has few protections
but strictly limits the technique to emergency threats of physical harm. States that
protect only against one practice are not regarded as having meaningful
protections.” Id. at 11 n.37.
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id.
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A. Missouri Legislature Proposed Legislation
Although efforts to pass comprehensive reform have failed in the past,
they were revived following the Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling in
Kanatzar.149 Representative Ian Mackey filed HB 1023 in 2019.150 The bill
passed through its committee by a unanimous vote, but the Speaker never
called it to the floor for debate.151 Rep. Mackey refiled the bill in 2020 as HB
1569.152 HB 1569 would have required school districts to report incidents of
physical restraint and seclusion, effective 2021.153 Specifically, HB 1569
would have required school districts to notify parents within twenty-four
hours154 and report all incidences of restraint and seclusion to DESE within
thirty days.155 Moreover, HB 1569 would have given parents and/or guardians
the right to review the DESE report and to file a complaint.156
At the same time, Representative Dottie Bailey filed House Bill 1568
(“HB 1568”), a bill with very similar language to HB 1569.157 Both HB 1568
and HB 1569 would have repealed Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 160.263.158 Further,
both HB 1568 and HB 1569 would have limited the use of restraint and
seclusion to instances of immediate threats to physical safety.159 However,
HB 1568 did have significant additions. First, it required parents or legal
guardians to file a complaint with the school district or charter school and, if
their “concerns . . . are not satisfactorily resolved,” they may file the
complaint with MODESE.160 HB 1568 also required schools to “make and
preserve both an audio and video recording of any incident involving
seclusion or isolation”161 and “provide the parents or legal guardians . . . with
a copy of every audio and video recording and written observation created
under subsection 2.”162 HB 1568 specified that reports of restraint and

149. See H.B. 1023, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2019).
150. Mo.
H.B.
1023,
https://house.mo.gov/Bill.aspx?bill=HB1023&year=2019&code=R..
151. See id..
152. See H.B. 1569, 100th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2020),
https://house.mo.gov/bill.aspx?bill=HB1569&year=2020&code=R.
153. Mo. H.B. 1569 § 4(1).
154. Mo. H.B. 1569 § 4(2).
155. Mo. H.B. 1569 § 4(1).
156. Mo. H.B. 1569 §§ 4(3)–(4).
157. Compare H.B. 1568, 100th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2020), with Mo.
H.B. 1569.
158.
Mo. H.B. 1568; Mo. H.B. 1569.
159. Mo. H.B. 1568 § 3(2); Mo. H.B. 1569 § 3.
160. H.B. 1568(4)(6).
161. H.B. 1568(2)(3).
162. H.B. 1568 § 4(4).
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seclusion must be written.163 Further, HB 1568 specified that it applies to
charter schools as well as public school districts.164
The strengthened provisions of both bills would have brought Missouri
in line with the majority of states on the use of physical restraint in public
schools. Unfortunately, neither bill became law in the 2020 legislative
session. HB 1568 passed the House and the Senate Committee on Education,
but was never voted on by the Senate.165

B. Policy Recommendations for Missouri Education Reform
Regardless of the Missouri legislature’s failure to act, there are a number
of ways in which Missouri law can be improved to limit the use of physical
restraint in schools and ultimately protect students and school officials. The
use and misuse of physical restraint is not unique to Missouri. The majority
of other states and municipalities have been more proactive in addressing this
issue, and their attempts provide invaluable insights for how Missouri might
Moreover, despite Missouri’s legislative and
craft its approach.166
administrative stagnation, the localized nature of education policy allows for
many of the reforms outlined below can be enacted on the county-, city-, or
district-level.167
First and foremost, Missouri should replace its voluntary guidelines with
enforceable statutes and regulations, thus joining the majority of states with

163. Mo. H.B. 1568 § 4(3)(a).
164. See, e.g., Mo. H.B. 1568 §§ 3(2), 4(2).
165. Missouri House of Representatives, HB 1568, (last updated April 28,
2020)
https://house.mo.gov/Bill.aspx?bill=HB1568&year=2020&code=R
https://perma.cc/XX77-UYE6.
166. See Butler, supra note 10, at 11.
167. For example, in 2015, Virginia passed a law that sharply limited the use
of physical restraint and seclusion, but has yet to promulgate the required
regulations to enforce the statute. See VA. CODE. ANN.§ 22.1-279.1:1 (2019). In
the absence of statewide regulations on physical restraint and seclusion, the school
board of the largest county in Virginia allocated $1 million “to remedy isolation
and restraint practices in the district.” Jenny Abamu, Fairfax County Allocates
Over $1 Million To Address Seclusion and Restraint Practices, WAMU (May 24,
2019), https://wamu.org/story/19/05/24/fairfax-county-allocates-over-1-millionto-address-seclusion-and-restraint-practices [https://perma.cc/KUF4-SLVT]. The
Fairfax County Public School Board made this decision following the publication
of a 2018 investigation by a local public broadcast affiliate, which revealed that
hundreds of instances of physical restraint and seclusion had gone unreported by
district staff. Jenny Abamu, Children Are Routinely Isolated In Some Fairfax
County Schools. The District Didn’t Report It, WAMU (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://wamu.org/story/19/03/13/children-are-routinely-isolated-in-some-fairfaxcounty-schools-the-district-didnt-report-it/ [https://perma.cc/QE8S-CDBB].
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strong legal protections for students from physical restraint.168 Further,
Missouri lawmakers should impose reasonable limitations on the
circumstances and ways in which physical restraint may be used. Most states
limit the use of physical restraint to threats of physical harm.169 Many states
also expressly prohibit the use of physical restraint as discipline or
punishment.170 In determining the scope of applicability for physical
restraints, policymakers should carefully consider prohibiting their use
168. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-14 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.125 (2014);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-105 (2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 49005–49006.4 (West
2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-111 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-236b
(2015); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 4112F (2014); FLA. STAT. § 1003.573 (2011);
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-240 (1987); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1-.35 (2010);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 302A-1141.4 (2014); 23 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 1.285
(2020); IND. CODE §§ 20-20-40-5, 20-20-40-11, 20-20-40-14 (2019); IOWA CODE
§ 280.21 (2017); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-103 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 726151-72-6158 (2015); 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160 (2019); ME. STAT. tit. 20-A
§ 4502 (2013); 05-071 ME. CODE. R. §§ 33.1-33.13 (LexisNexis 2001); MD. CODE
ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-1101-1104 (2017); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.04.0213A.08.04.06 (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 37G (West 2000); 603
MASS. CODE REGS. 46.01-46.07 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1307a-h
(2017); 07-000 MISS. CODE R. § 003.1.1 (LexisNexis 2020); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 126-U:1–U:8 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.12 (2017); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 115C-390.3, 115C-391.1 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.4
(2018); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-35-15 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.205,
339.285 (2019); OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0550, 581-021-0553 (2019); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 16-60-4 (2017); 200 R.I. CODE R. §§ 20-30-2.1–2.4 (2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 53G-8-203, 53G-8-302 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1167 (2012);
22-036 VT. CODE R. §§ 4500–4510 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.485
(2015); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-400-825 (2018); W. VA. CODE R. § §126-995 (2019); WIS. STAT. §§ 118.305, 118.31 (2019).
169. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.125(b) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2620-111(2)–(3) (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-236b(6)(b) (2015); DEL. CODE
ANN., tit. 14, §§ 4112F(b)(2)(a), (e) (2014); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, §
1.285(d)(1) (2020).
170. The following states have enacted such a prohibition: Alaska, Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. Butler, supra note 10, at 53. The following states have enacted such
a prohibition, but only with respect to students with disabilities: Louisiana,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and New York. Id. Missouri, on the other
hand, expressly states that “[s]panking, when administered by certificated
personnel and in the presence of a witness who is an employee of the school
district, or the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property, when
administered by personnel of a school district in a reasonable manner in
accordance with the local board of education’s written policy of discipline, is not
abuse within the meaning of chapter 210.” MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(10) (2017)
(emphasis added).
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altogether. As aforementioned, the efficacy of this intervention method is far
from established.171 Moreover, under existing federal law, children are
protected from the use of physical restraints in other contexts, such as
hospitals and other inpatient institutions.172 At the very least, state law should
require that less restrictive interventions fail or prove ineffective before
physical restraint can be used.173 Moreover, the use of physical restraint
should cease as soon as the emergency subsides.174

171. . Classrooms in Crisis: Examining the Inappropriate Use of Seclusion
and Restraint Practices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood,
Elementary, and Secondary Education of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the
Workforce, 116th Cong. 7-10 (2019) (statement of George Sugai, Ph.D., Neag
School of Education, University of Connecticut); Beyond Seclusion and
Restraint: Creating Positive Learning Environments for All Students: Hearing
Before the Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 4-6
(2012) (statement of Daniel Crimmins, Ph.D., Director, Center for Leadership in
Disability).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 290jj (2000). Known as the Children’s Health Act of 2000,
this law amended Title V of the Public Health Service Act and was passed in
response to studies that indicated a staggering number of deaths caused by
restraint in psychiatric and mental health facilities. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFF., MENTAL HEALTH: IMPROPER RESTRAINT OR SECLUSION USE PLACES
PEOPLE AT RISK 6–7 (1999), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228149.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JBE8-WGYQ] (describing the dangerous use and effects of
restraint and seclusion in mental health facilities and hospitals and showing that
children are disproportionately affected).
173. States that have enacted a similar provision include Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Butler, supra note 10, at 56.
174. Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware
(restraint only), Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois (restraint only), Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Utah,
Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. See id. at 60–61. (“By law, restraint
must cease when there is no longer an emergency for all students in 27 states, for
children with disabilities, in 31 states: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware (restraint only), Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois
(restraint only), Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico (2017),
Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, and West Virginia . . . Maryland’s durational limit differs from the
others in that it sets a hard deadline of 30 minutes under all circumstances, which
seems designed to protect children. Maryland is to be lauded for this, but the
standard may raise some issues if an emergency ends within 5-10 minutes and a
child is still in restraint or seclusion.”).
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When physical restraints are used, every effort must be made to reduce
the risk of physical harm to the student. As illustrated by Israel Mariano’s
experience, as well as the GAO Report’s finding of at least twenty student
deaths from physical restraint, the risk to students cannot be overstated and
must be substantially mitigated wherever possible.175 Accordingly, state law
should ban physical restraints that pose a grave risk to life, namely mechanical
restraints,176 chemical restraints,177 and restraints that restrict breathing.
Twenty-seven states prohibit physical restraints that obstruct breathing or
threaten life, regardless of whether the student has disabilities.178 Even states

175. State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187, 189 (Mo. banc 2019);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., MENTAL HEALTH: IMPROPER RESTRAINT OR
SECLUSION
USE
PLACES
PEOPLE
AT
RISK
6–7
(1999),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228149.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBE8-WGYQ].
176. Mechanical restraint is defined as “[t]he use of any device or equipment
to restrict a student’s freedom of movement.” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTRAINT
AND
SECLUSION:
RESOURCE
DOCUMENT
10
(2012),
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/restraints-and-seclusion-resources.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JBE8-WGYQ]. Common examples of mechanical restraints
involve ropes, duct tape, bungee cords, and other devices. See MAJORITY STAFF
OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON
DANGEROUS USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINTS IN SCHOOLS REMAINS
WIDESPREAD AND DIFFICULT TO REMEDY: A REVIEW OF TEN CASES,
6,
17–18,
24,
26–27,
29
(2014),
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Seclusion%20and%20Restraints%2
0Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NES-KRQZ]. The states that ban
mechanical restraint of all children include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado (with
exceptions for children displaying deadly weapons and other exceptions),
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana (only for
children with disabilities), Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana (only for children with disabilities), Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania (only
for children with disabilities), Tennessee (only for children with disabilities),
Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Butler, supra note 10,
at 70.
177. Chemical restraints involve the use of chemicals to restrict a student’s
freedom of movement. Butler, supra note 10, at 71. The states that currently
prohibit chemical restraints include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. Two states, Connecticut and Tennessee, have laws
that regulate chemical restraint differently, explicitly allowing its use under
certain circumstances. Id. at 71–72.
178. These states include Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon,
Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id. at 64–65.
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without such prohibitions have enacted some form of protection against
restraints which restrict breathing.179
The use of physical restraints can also be limited through investment in
positive behavioral support and preventative interventions.180 By providing
school officials with trauma-informed training, they are better able to respond
to a potentially threatening situation and are less likely to have to resort to
physical restraint.181 While Missouri’s non-binding guidance urges training
in “safe and appropriate use” of physical restraints, other states have taken
various other approaches. States differ widely in the type of training required,
though only a few states have explicitly required that school officials receive
training on evidence-based techniques “shown to be effective” in preventing
the use of the practices and in keeping personnel and students safe, and only
for certain requirements.182 Roughly half of all states require school officials
to be trained in conflict de-escalation and the prevention of physical
restraint.183 A smaller number of these states also train staff on positive
179. Georgia law prohibits the use of “prone restraint” on all students, while
Pennsylvania law prohibits its use on students with disabilities. Id. at 64. Prone
restraint, which involves pinning a student face-down, often causes suffocation
because the compression of the chest cavity prevents the lungs from expanding.
DISABILITY RIGHTS CALIFORNIA, THE LETHAL HAZARD OF PRONE RESTRAINT:
POSITIONAL
ASPHYXIATION
17–18
(2002),
https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files?file=file-attachments/701801.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV3F-DV95]; NATIONAL DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK,
SCHOOL IS NOT SUPPOSED TO HURT: INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON ABUSIVE
RESTRAINF AND SECLUSION IN SCHOOLS 13 (2009), https://www.ndrn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/SR-Report2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QUA-6M23]
(“Studies and organizations, including the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations, have concluded that prone restraint may predispose a
patient to suffocation.”).
180. TEX. JUV .JUSTICE DEPT., EFFECTIVENESS OF POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL
SUPPORTS,
REPORT
TO
TEXAS
LEGISLATURE
22
(2012),
https://www2.tjjd.texas.gov/publications/reports/PBISLegislativeReport201212.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EWE-BLJY].
181. NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTORS, SIX CORE
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT AS A PLANNING
TOOL
2
(2006),
https://www.nasmhpd.org/sites/default/files/Consolidated%20Six%20Core%20S
trategies%20Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/68UG-U9UN].
182. Butler, supra note 10, at 110. These states include Oregon, Utah
Wyoming, Alaska, and Hawaii. Id.
183. These states include Alaska, Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Maine, Minnesota (applies only to students with disabilities), Michigan,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Nevada (applies only to students with disabilities),
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee (applies only to students with
disabilities), Texas (applies only to students with disabilities), Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 111. Utah is also expected to
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behavioral supports.184 At least eight states require periodic retraining.185
Some states require staff training on first aid, signs of medical distress,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and other similar issues.186 Finally, a few
states require training on the dangers of physical restraint.187
With regard to district-level data on the use of physical restraints,
Missouri law should mandate reporting and incentivize transparency. It is in
the public’s interest to have accurate and up-to-date information about the use
of physical restraint in public schools. While no one would ever question the
fact that school officials work incredibly hard to protect students, physical
restraints pose a unique risk of harm that necessitates additional safeguards to
ensure transparency and accountability. At a bare minimum, state law should
mandate that school boards provide annual reports on their use of physical
restraint.188 Several states have had such procedures in place for years.189 One
adopt this provision in its final regulations, now in the final stages of
promulgation. Id.
184. These states include Alaska, Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id. In addition, “Utah requires training in
evidence-based practices, which almost certainly includes training in positive and
preventative behavioral supports.” Id. Note that “states may require PBIS
training in other statutes or regulations.” Id.
185. Colorado (retrain every two years), Hawaii, Iowa (periodic retraining),
Illinois (retrain every two years), Indiana (recurrent training in accord with plan
adopted by each school), Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey (applies only to
students with disabilities; school officials must update training annually). Id. at
112.
186. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Rhode Island (part of in-depth training for
certain key staff), and Vermont. Id. at 111.
187. These states include Colorado (including dangers of prone restraint),
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. Id.
188. Id. at 103. The states that currently require annual reporting to the State
Educational Agency include Alaska, Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida (only for students with disabilities), Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana (only for students with disabilities), Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada (only for
students with disabilities), Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee (only for
students with disabilities), Texas (only for students with disabilities), Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
189. For example, Connecticut recorded 37,929 incidents of restraint and
seclusion for 2016-17, in response to its state data collection law. CONN. ST. DEPT.
OF EDUC., 2017-2018 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINT AND
SECLUSION
IN
CONNECTICUT
5
(2017),
http://edsight.ct.gov/relatedreports/RS%20Report%20to%20Legislature%20201
6-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKQ9-72VN]. Maine data collected under state law
showed 3,576 restraint incidents and 4,217 seclusion incidents in 2018, with
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of the major challenges to policymakers in addressing the misuse of physical
restraints is the lack of available data.190 This data can lead to reform at both
the state- and local-level, by galvanizing lawmakers with concrete facts and
by helping school districts identify and remedy the overuse of restraint in
specific schools.191 Finally, in addition to enacting reporting requirements,
the state legislature should consider how the accuracy of these reports will be
verified. There have been numerous examples of local school districts
seclusion increasing by 1,690 incidents from 2017. Me. Dep’t of Educ. Data
Restraint
and
Seclusion
Annual
Report
(2018),
https://www.maine.gov/doe/schools/safeschools/restraint#data
[https://perma.cc/D9DN-FAV2]. Delaware data collected under state law
included 3,006 incidents of physical restraint in 2016-17. Dela. Dep’t of Educ.,
2016-2017 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINT IN DELAWARE
PUBLIC
DISTRICT
AND
CHARTER
SCHOOLS
9
(2017),
https://www.doe.k12.de.us/cms/lib/DE01922744/Centricity/Domain/167/FINAL
%20Restraint%202016-2017%20Annual%20Report%20Supressed%20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GK27-RSNW]. Ohio’s data showed more than 10,000 restraint
and seclusion occurrences in 2013-14, many of which involved students with
disabilities and young students, in the 3rd grade or below, Disability Rights Ohio
reported in 2015. DISABILITY RIGHTS OHIO, THE STATE OF RESTRAINT AND
SECLUSION IN OHIO: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM OHIO’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3
(2015),
https://www.disabilityrightsohio.org/assets/documents/dro_restraint_and_seclusi
on_ode_data_report.pdf?pdf=restraint_and_seclusion_ode_data_report
[https://perma.cc/C52D-AGZM].
190. Michael A. Nunno, Restraint and Seclusion Use in U.S. School Settings:
Recommendations From Allied Treatment Disciplines, 82 AM. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 75, 76 (2012).
191. Data collection and public attention can make a real difference, as seen
in Florida. Florida began collecting data by law in 2010. In 2011-12, Florida
recorded 9,751 restraint and 4,245 seclusion episodes in 2011-12. Sarah Gonzalez
and John O’Connor, Florida Keeps Two Sets of Seclusion Data and Why Neither
May Tell the Full Story, STATE IMPACT: A REPORTING PROJECT OF NPR (Aug. 14,
2012), https://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2012/08/14/florida-keeps-two-sets-ofseclusion-data-and-why-neither-may-tell-the-full-story/
[https://perma.cc/WN5B-SGGG]. The mandatory state data reporting caused
Pasco, Florida schools to focus on how frequently seclusion was utilized and to
move to end its use as twenty-eight other Florida districts did, the Tampa Bay
Times reported. Jeffrey S. Solochek, Pasco Schools Aim to End Use of Seclusion
BAY
TIMES
(Aug.
31,
2014),
Rooms,
TAMPA
https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/pasco-schools-aim-to-end-useof-seclusion-rooms/2195588/ [https://perma.cc/Y944-V68X]. The District’s
Director of Student Support Services explained, “Based on more recent research,
and people being able to articulate the trauma they have experienced, we don’t
feel it’s in the best interest of children. . . . We thought there were no other choices
before.” Id. A Special Education Supervisor echoed these sentiments, ‘The law
helped us understand what our practices were. . . . We had to take ownership of
it, and we have to take action to make things better.’” Id.
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underreporting the number of disciplinary incidents that occurred in its
schools.192
Finally, Missouri law should require more communication with and
involvement of parents and/or guardians. Another important avenue for
reform is increased parent involvement. Following the physical restraint of a
student, prompt and candid communication with parents and/or guardians is
crucial for many reasons. After an incident, the student may need immediate
medical or psychological treatment. Communication also enables parents and
school officials to work together to support the student and prevent further
incidents. When parents are left in the dark, it undermines their trust in school
officials and often leads to lengthy, costly, and painfully public disputes.193

192. In 2011-12, Prince William County Public Schools in Virginia (over
81,000 students in 88 schools) reported no use of restraint or seclusion, although
news reports indicated that the practices were used with some frequency within
the district. Donna St. George, Prince William Schools Restrain, Seclude
Disabled Kids Frequently, Inquiry Finds, WASH. POST (Aug 6. 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/prince-william-schoolsrestrain-seclude-disabled-kids-too-frequently-inquiryfinds/2014/08/06/a2b2d6e8-1cbb-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/X9FJ-PSZT]; Kentucky’s Jefferson County Public Schools
reported only 174 restraint and seclusion episodes in 2014-15 to the state, even
though it restrained or secluded students over 4,000 times, an event reported
extensively by local media outlets. Allison Ross and Deborah Yetter, State Slams
JCPS, Orders Restraint Review, Louisville Courier-Journal (July 20, 2016),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/education/2016/07/20/state-doonsite-review-jcps-over-restraint-concerns/87345324/ [https://perma.cc/PB8FRPGG]. An independent auditor hired by the county reported that administrators
found that some employees were allegedly discouraged from reporting serious
disciplinary incidents. Id. As part of the ensuing investigation, the Kentucky
Education Commissioner sent personnel to review the district’s restraint and
seclusion policies. See id.; Allison Ross, Audit: ‘Code of Silence’ in JCPS on
Restraint, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (May 10, 2016), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/education/2016/05/10/audit-code-silence-jcpsrestraint/84176526/ [https://perma.cc/KJ9T-6UNX]; Antoinette Konz, Auditor:
JCPS Employees Were Told Not to Report Seclusion, Restraint Incidents, WDRB
(May 10, 2016), https://www.wdrb.com/news/education/auditor-jcps-employeeswere-told-not-to-report-seclusion-restraint-incidents/article_e22a540a-e53d52a2-bf6a-34de833ca0d9.html [https://perma.cc/G2NQ-ZYUH]; Kara Kenney,
CALL 6: School Districts Misreport Seclusion, Restraint Incidents, WRTV
INDIANAPOLIS
(Oct.
10,
2016),
https://www.wrtv.com/news/call-6investigators/call-6-school-districts-misreport-seclusion-restraint-incidents.
193. See, e.g., Jenny Abamu & Rob Manning, Desperation and Broken Trust
when Schools Restrain Students or Lock Them in Rooms, NPR (June 5, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/05/726519409/desperation-and-broken-trustwhen-schools-restrain-students-or-lock-them-in-room [ https://perma.cc/7RRQQK5K]; Rob Manning, NW Parents Challenge Schools’ Handling of Students
PUB.
BROAD.
(Mar.
18,
2019),
with
Disabilities,
OR.
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The majority of states currently require parents and/or guardians to be notified
if their student is physically restrained.194

VI. CONCLUSION
Though it has long been settled that the constitutional rights of students
are not coextensive to the rights of adults in other settings, the Supreme Court
of Missouri’s recent decision, State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, demonstrated
this distinction in a tragic yet powerful way. By extending official immunity
to a school official who quite possibly erred in executing a physical restraint
technique and ultimately broke a student’s arm, State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar
significantly narrowed the protection and recourse available to Mariano and
other similarly situated students. But this case was not decided in a vacuum.
Rather, it parallels the state government’s lack of protection for students due
to relatively weak laws and non-binding administrative guidance on the use
of physical restraint. Missouri’s approach to the physical restraint of students
is out of line with the majority of states as well as the federal government.
The present reality is not lost on Missouri state legislators, some of whom
have proposed legislation that would limit the circumstances in which
physical restraint could be used, mandate data reporting, and better engage
parents and guardians. While this Note offers several proposals for
strengthening student protections, many of which are included in the proposed
legislation, the overarching message is that something must be done at the
state and local level. Each and every time a student is physically restrained
by a school official, both parties are at risk of physical harm and psychological
trauma. The seriousness of this behavioral technique, which is properly
understood as a means of last resort, necessitates some form of government
regulation. The safety of public schools, students, and education professionals
is at stake.

https://www.opb.org/news/article/school-discipline-students-special-needsrestraints-washington-oregon/ [https://perma.cc/Y5HY-FMX8].
194. Butler, supra note 10, at 87. These states include Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland (unless otherwise stated in the
student’s IEP/BIP), Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina (but notification is not required in a number of
circumstances), Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
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